Moneylending and financial leads: RM236 million on the books, borrowers unnamed

Approximately RM236 million in outstanding loans: a figure is disclosed, but the borrowers are not individually named. Farhash's MMAG shares also appear in a pledged-securities account with the same licensed moneylender.

The two records are striking side by side, but that does not put the entire RM236 million against Farhash's name.

First, return to the announcement after Velocity sold its MMAG shares.

In a supplementary announcement dated 21 January 2026, the company stated that RM3.5 million of the proceeds would be allocated to its financial-services business, specifically mentioning moneylending.

The shares were sold, and some proceeds were earmarked for another business. The announcement describes an intended use, not a payment list proving that the RM3.5 million had already been disbursed transaction by transaction.

That business already existed within the Velocity group.

Its subsidiary Velocity Capital Sdn Bhd is a licensed moneylender. As at 31 December 2025, disclosed outstanding loans totalled approximately RM236 million: about RM180 million in corporate loans and RM55.73 million in personal loans.

More than RM200 million on the books is substantial. But this is a loan balance, not annual profit or cash personally held by Dato Ben. Once money has been lent, it must be recovered before a book balance becomes usable cash again.

The disclosure reveals the scale of the business, not each individual borrower.

That is why Farhash's share registration stands out.

The 462 million MMAG shares he acquired involved a pledged-securities account maintained for him by Velocity Capital Sdn Bhd. Financial reporting records that the shares later moved to Future Star while remaining in a pledged account with that moneylender.

The shares changed holder; the account connection remained.

But the account does not explain the loan amount, use of funds or contractual terms. RM236 million is one company's loan balance; 462 million is a share count in a different record. Putting them side by side raises questions. Equating them goes beyond the documents.

The public disclosures establish a business, dates, balances and a pledged-registration connection. Licensed moneylending is not itself evidence of unlawful activity.

The insider material describes a different layer.

It portrays Dato Ben as a figure above an underground lending network, claiming that small underground lending agents must follow his instructions and work for him. The focus moves from the size of a particular loan to who can still take business independently and who must accept arrangements from above.

The Haolong article asks “who receives the bets?” This insider account asks “whose instructions do the agents follow?” Similar power relationships do not establish a story in which the same agent moves from gambling into moneylending.

The local channel offers another lead. On 9 January 2025, an image targeting Hii Lu Kwong on @Sg265alibaba lists “duit ah long” among his alleged activities. It does not explain how this business connects to Dato Ben through instructions, profit-sharing or transfers.

Two names appearing in the same channel does not connect their accounts.

Further afield, insider material discusses offsetting transfers and currency exchange, claiming that funds bypass normal channels and cause losses to the country. An older insider account describes a suspected money-laundering route from China to JB, with JB as the main base.

Lending concerns borrowing and repayment; currency exchange concerns transfers and conversion; route allegations concern origins and destinations. Each can be examined separately. Grouping them under “underground banking” does not turn them into one verified financial chain. The material also gives no calculation of the country's alleged loss.

With USDT, the channel directs its allegations towards listed companies.

On 31 October 2024, post 1002 on @Sg265alibaba names Dato Ben, Dato Liu and Dato Pang. It alleges the use of USDT to launder money and obtain assets in Malaysian listed companies, and asks authorities to examine the fund flows. Post 1003 then lists people and company names.

The allegations are serious and the list is long. But the posts do not show a continuous record of which wallet sent which payment, through which transaction, and into which company's accounts. Asset or capital figures beside company names also cannot be added across different categories and labelled a total laundered amount.

Several different ledgers are before us: publicly disclosed licensed lending, underground agents described by insiders, and cross-border or USDT leads raised by the channel. The first contains balances. The others contain allegations, names and directions. What remains missing is a record connecting specific transactions.

RM236 million is striking, and RM3.5 million has an announced intended use. The figures should speak for their own scale, not for undisclosed contracts.

The length of a list of names cannot ultimately answer where money comes from or where it goes.

Which payment started where, and where it ended up: that is the next page these financial leads need to supply.