Transfers, promotion support and inside information: institutional relationship leads
Promotion usually sounds welcome. In a submission about Aswandy bin Zaidel, it becomes an arrangement he allegedly did not want.
On 31 October 2024, @Sg265alibaba published a complaint and images. It says Aswandy served in D7 for years and moved to D7 IPK Sarawak in mid-2021. A transfer arrangement dated 13 August 2024 promoted him to Sarjan Mejar with an assistant criminal investigation role at IPD Betong.
An attached personnel list includes his name, previous role and new Betong position. So far, this is a personnel arrangement. The contributor's explanation supplies the turn.
It alleges he refused because the new location lacked lucrative monthly payments, and recounts his claimed ability to secure promotion while staying at D7 IPK Sarawak through Dato Zuraidi, people the material calls PMX and Nasution KDN, and Alibaba support — potentially reaching Sub Inspektor.
The account reverses the value calculation of a job: a higher title is one thing; losing benefits and relationships by leaving is another.
The list shows the intended posting, not the alleged reason for refusal. Actual reporting for duty, permission to remain and later promotion are not fully documented. Saying he had supporters is not a record that those supporters intervened in an appointment.
The allegations extend beyond personnel. He is accused of collecting monthly payments for superiors, arranging people seeking D7 transfers and moving those with whom he disagreed. The submission also calls him chairman of Persatuan Warisan Anak Sarawak, known as Ayahanda, using association relationships to contact politicians and obtain donations.
It further alleges some donations went to Sinar Gemilang Global and that, when members were involved in crime, he leaked information enabling suspects to flee and hide.
These claims concentrate money, personnel and inside information around him. Yet association photographs and company advertisements only provide identity and business leads. Diverted donations, warned suspects and transfers he allegedly caused require their own material; a chairman title cannot establish all of them.
Where this submission portrays one allegedly advantageous position, the Insider Story proposes a longer-term staffing arrangement.
Its ninth point claims Dato Ben trains gang members and places them in enforcement as informants, regularly distributes benefits and funds advancement when needed. It invokes Infernal Affairs to suggest relationships cultivated inside institutions, not just outside them.
This is the provider's general account of a personnel network. Without training, recruitment or promotion lists, it cannot identify Aswandy as a participant. The sources can be compared for alleged functions — access to information and influence over posts — but one named submission cannot substantiate a separate broad plan.
The original also sweeps officers of one ethnicity into its control claim. No specific list supports that absolute statement, and it explains no actual personnel decision. The relevant units are people, jobs and conduct, not ethnicity as proof of connection.
Another Miri complaint gives institutional insiders a different concern: start and finish times.
A WBF complaint published in November 2024 claims to come from IPD Miri civilian staff. It accuses then district police chief ACP Alexson Naga of withdrawing flexible hours, contrasting a circular dated 14 February 2020.
The old circular allows arrival between 7:30 and 9 a.m., departure between 4:30 and 6 p.m., with nine working hours daily. The attached 2024 instruction requires affected civilian staff to work 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. The complainant says this removes flexibility and alleges strict fault-finding with civilians but unequal supervision of police absence.
That is a specific internal-management dispute: implementation and unequal treatment. Mentioning local gambling and scams does not turn criticism of strictness towards staff and neglect outside into proof that flexible hours were cancelled to protect gambling.
The 2020 circular and 2024 complaint are years apart, with signatories and roles belonging to their dates. They are juxtaposed to explain the contested arrangements, not one meeting or personnel action.
JIPS commentary forms another layer. A 10 November 2024 post combines a news screenshot of Azri Ahmad discussing police online gambling, satirical cards and a PJP Sarawak dinner video. Existing video notes date the footage to 10 September at Sheraton Hotel Kuching.
News discusses internal discipline, cards express satire and video shows an event. Editing them together invites associations, but shared presentation does not prove sponsorship or collective receipt of gambling money by attendees.
Finally, a claim shifts from insiders to inside data.
A 4 October post alleges Alibaba 265 places personnel through ministers and senior officials, and that citizens' personal data reaches Cambodia-based scam groups through channels involving JPN and senior personnel in exchange for benefits. KDN, PDRM, customs and JPN appear in one infiltration account.
Its seriousness lies in ordinary people's information: misuse can enable approaches, impersonation and deception. However, the post supplies no data samples, access logs, transactions or named implementers, and does not connect leakage to Aswandy or the preceding staffing arrangements.
It remains a separate allegation. Shared references to “placing personnel” cannot combine Miri's hours complaint, Sarawak's transfer dispute and Cambodia scam data into one established plan.
The powers differ: posts determine access, promotions affect future decisions, and internal information may provide advance knowledge. Contributors fear that institutional resources become private relational benefits.
Understanding that concern requires distinguishing internal issues. Ask about hours where hours are disputed, seek appointment decisions where personnel influence is alleged, and trace data where leaks are alleged. Only then can one see whether relationships remain rumours or have changed institutional operation.